Order/Judgment in Text

2025:HHC:36364

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CWP No.8622 of 2024
Decided on: 27th October, 2025
__________________________________________________
Om Prakash

....Petitioner
Versus

Hon’ble High Court of H.P and others
...Respondents
___________________________________________________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes
For the petitioner:

Mr. B.L. Soni and Mr. Nitin Soni,
Advocates.

For the respondents:

Mr. Shriyek Sharda, Advocate, for
respondents No.1 and 2.
Mr. Arjun Lall, Advocate, for respondent
No.3.

G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral)
The challenge in the present writ petition is to the
initiation of the disciplinary proceedings dated 10th July, 2024
(Annexure P-2) by the District and Sessions Judge, Mandi, under
Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1965, as per the statement of the articles of charges
issued as per Article-I and Article-II.
2.

1

The resultant proceedings, whereby the Inquiry Officer

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

2

as such was appointed namely Mr. Avinash Chander, Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Sundernagar, are also subject matter
of consideration, along with the Presenting Officer, Sh. Khem Raj,
Record Keeper, being appointed on 31st of July, 2024, Annexures P3
and P4, respectively.
3.

The sum and substance of the argument raised by the

learned counsel for the petitioner-employee, who is a Senior
Assistant working with the District Legal Services Authority, Mandi,
District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as “DLSA”), is that he
was appointed by the H.P. State Legal Services Authority, Kasumpti,
Shimla (hereinafter referred to as “SLSA”) on 25.10.2016 and
was placed at the disposal of the Chairman (District Judge), DLSA,
Mandi for reporting for duty. It is accordingly the case of the counsel
for the petitioner that having been appointed by the SLSA,
disciplinary proceedings could not be initiated by the District and
Sessions Judge, Mandi, not being the State Legal Services
Authority under Section 6 of The Legal Services Authorities Act,
1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
4.

The stand taken by respondent No.3/SLSA is that the

District Judge is the Chairman of the District Authority in terms of
Section 9(2)(a) of the Act and the action was initiated in the capacity
of the Chairman, DLSA. The appointing authority is the Member

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Secretary, SLSA acting as a Head of the Department in consultation
with the Chief Justice. The action as such has been held to be
justified.
5.

The reply filed by respondent No.2 states that vide

letter dated 22.03.2024 (Annexure R-2), it was conveyed to the
Chairman, DLSA that the Hon’ble Executive Chairman of the SLSA
had directed that all communications received from the Secretary,
DLSA, addressed against the present petitioner, regarding the act of
insubordination, non-compliance with the orders, dereliction of duty
etc. shall be sent to the Chairman, DLSA, for further necessary
action at own level being the Chairman-cum-Controlling Officer of
DLSA. The proceedings had been initiated under Rule 14 of the
CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, in view of the directions of the Hon’ble
Executive Chairman, SLSA.
6.

The argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner at

the first blush appears to be very attractive, especially keeping in
view the fact that at the initial stage, after the fact finding inquiry had
been done on 12.12.2022, vide communication dated 16.03.2024
(Annexure

R-3/A),

the

Member

Secretary,

SLSA,

had

communicated to the petitioner that he was not complying with the
directions and would have to be dealt with in accordance with the
rules and called for his explanation. The said communication had

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been forwarded at the district level to the DLSA on 16.03.2025 itself.
The petitioner had filed his reply to the same on 18.03.2024
(Annexure R3/B), raising various objections but never raised the
issue of jurisdiction. The reply thus had been firstly forwarded on
18.03.2024 by the Member Secretary, DLSA, at the District level to
the Chairman, DLSA who on 19.03.2024 (Annexure R3/C) had
forwarded the same to the Member Secretary, SLSA.
7.

The petitioner in his rejoinder to the reply filed by

respondents No.1 and 2, has also taken a plea that the matter was
never placed before the appointing authority i.e. State Authority for
taking necessary action and therefore, keeping in view Rules 3 and
6 of the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority Rules,
1995, the Member Secretary, could not delegate the powers and
authority of the State Authority to the Chairman, District Legal
Services Authority, for taking any disciplinary action.
8.

Keeping in view the above, counsel for the respondent-

SLSA placed before us the noting portion dated 21.03.2024,
whereby the then Executive Chairman, SLSA, had approved the
proposal as such that the Chairman, DLSA, would take necessary
action at his own level with the request to send the action taken
report to the Authority, while also approving various proposals to
look into the financial irregularities and to visit Mandi and examine

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the entire financial record of the DLSA and give a detailed status
report.
9.

It is not disputed that on 22.03.2024 (Annexure R-2),

the Member Secretary, SLSA, also wrote to the Chairman, DLSA,
that he had been directed by the Hon’ble Executive Chairman to
take action at his own level being the Chairman-cum-Controlling
Officer of DLSA. The said letter reads as under:“112-LSA/Estt. Part-XV/2024/853

22.03.2024

To
The Chairman (District Judge),
District Legal Services Authority, Mandi,
District Mandi, H.P.
Sub:-

Complaint of Shri Om Prakash, Senior Assistant,
DLSA, Mandi alongwith entire record.

Sir,
On the captioned subject, I have been directed
by the Hon’ble Executive Chairman of this Authority to
send all the communication received from the Ld.
Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, Mandi which
she addressed against Shri Om Prakash, Senior Assistant
regarding acts of insubordination, non-compliance with
orders, dereliction of duty etc. alongwith copy of noting
dated 16th March, 2024 of this Authority alongwith the reply
of the official concerned as well as complaint of Shri Om
Prakash regarding harassment etc. to your goodself for
further necessary action at your own level being the
Chairman-cum-Controlling Officer of DLSA, Mandi.”

10.

It is apparently in such circumstances, the petitioner as

such was charge-sheeted on 10th July, 2024 and vide orders, both

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dated 31st July, 2024 (Annexures P3 and P4), the Inquiry Officer and
the Presenting Officer were duly appointed.
11.

Counsel for the petitioner has thus placed heavy

reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and
others vs. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351, to contend that the
methodology as such which had been adopted by the appointing
authority and giving the power at the district level was not justified in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
12.

Counsel for respondent No.3, on the other hand, has

placed reliance upon a recent judgment of the Apex Court in State
of Jharkhand and others vs. Rukma Kesh Mishra (2025) SCC
OnLine SC 676 where B.V. Gopinath’s case was also discussed.
13.

It has accordingly been held that the disciplinary

authority is mandated by law to ‘draw up’ or ‘cause to be drawn up’
the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and
it may not prepare the document but rather delegate the task to
someone else and if the delegation is proved and nothing much is to
be done and the courts ought to exercise restraint.
14.

It is also a matter of record that vide Resolution No.4

dated 17.04.1998, which also finds mentioned in the appointment
letter dated 25.10.2016 (Annexure P-1), the Member Secretary,
SLSA, was declared as the Head of the Department under the

7

Fundamental Supplementary Rules, which fact is not disputed and
which is rather the stand of the counsel for the petitioner also.
Section 6 and 9 of The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 reads
as under:“[6. Constitution of State Legal Services Authority.-(1)
Every State Government shall constitute a body to be called the State
Legal Services Authority for the State to exercise the powers and
perform the functions conferred on, or assigned to, a State Authority
under this Act.
(2)

A State Authority shall consist of—
(a) the Chief Justice of the High Court who shall be the
Patron-in-Chief;
(b) a serving or retired Judge of the High Court, to be
nominated by the Governor, in consultation with the
Chief Justice of the High Court, who shall be the
Executive Chairman;
(c) such number of other members, possessing such
experience and qualifications as may be prescribed by
the State Government, to be nominated by that
Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the
High Court.

(3)

The State Government shall, in consultation with the

Chief Justice of the High Court, appoint a person belonging to
the State Higher Judicial Service, not lower in rank than that of
a District Judge, as the Member-Secretary of the State
Authority, to exercise such powers and perform such duties
under the Executive Chairman of the State Authority as may
be prescribed by that Government or as may be assigned to
him by the Executive Chairman of that Authority:

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Provided that a person functioning as Secretary of a
State Legal Aid and Advice Board immediately before the date
of constitution of the State Authority may be appointed as
Member-Secretary of that Authority, even if he is not qualified
to be appointed as such under this sub-section, for a period
not exceeding five years.
(4)

The terms of office and other conditions relating

thereto, of members and the Member-Secretary of the State
Authority shall be such as may be prescribed by the State
Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High
Court.
(5)

The State Authority may appoint such number of

officers and other employees as may be prescribed by the
State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the
High Court, for the efficient discharge of its functions under
this Act.
(6)

The officers and other employees of the State Authority

shall be entitled to such salary and allowances and shall be
subject to such other conditions of service as may be
prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the
Chief Justice of the High Court.
(7)

The administrative expenses of every State Authority,

including the salaries, allowances and pensions payable to the
Member-Secretary, officers and other employees of the State
Authority shall be defrayed out of the Consolidated Fund of the
State.
(8)

All orders and decisions of the State Authority shall be

authenticated by the Member-Secretary or any other officer of
the State Authority duly authorised by the Executive Chairman
of the State Authority.
(9)

No act or proceeding of a State Authority shall be

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invalid merely on the ground of the existence of any vacancy
in, or any defect in the constitution of, the State Authority.]
[9.

District

Legal

Services

Authority-(1)

The

State

Government shall, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High
Court, constitute a body to be called the District Legal Services
Authority for every District in the State to exercise the powers and
perform the functions conferred on, or assigned to, the District
Authority under this Act.
(2) A District Authority shall consist of—
(a) the District Judge who shall be its Chairman; and
(b) such number of other members, possessing such
experience and qualifications, as may be prescribed by the
State Government, to be nominated by that Government in
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court.
(3) The State Authority shall, in consultation with the Chairman
of the District Authority, appoint a person belonging to the
State Judicial Service not lower in rank than that of a
Subordinate Judge or Civil Judge posted at the seat of the
District Judiciary as Secretary of the District Authority to
exercise such powers and perform such duties under the
Chairman of that Committee as may be assigned to him by
such Chairman.
(4) The terms of office and other conditions relating thereto, of
members and Secretary of the District Authority shall be such
as may be determined by regulations made by the State
Authority in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High
Court.
(5) The District Authority may appoint such number of officers
and other employees as may be prescribed by the State
Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High

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Court for the efficient discharge of its functions.
(6) The officers and other employees of the District Authority
shall be entitled to such salary and allowances and shall be
subject to such other conditions of service as may be
prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the
Chief Justice of the High Court.
(7) The administrative expenses of every District Authority,
including the salaries, allowances and pensions payable to the
Secretary, officers and other employees of the District Authority
shall be defrayed out of the Consolidated Fund of the State.
(8) All orders and decisions of the District Authority shall be
authenticated by the Secretary or by any other officer of the
District Authority duly authorised by the Chairman of that
Authority.
(9) No act or proceeding of a District Authority shall be invalid
merely on the ground of the existence of any vacancy in, or
any defect in, the constitution of the District Authority.]”

15.

We are thus of the considered opinion that the

judgment in Rukma Kesh Mishra’s case (supra) has held that the
interference by the Courts, once the superior officer as such has
granted the delegation, is not to be interfered with. In the said case,
apparently, disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and the
challenge was raised by the employee in question who was a
Member of the Civil Service of the State. The argument raised was
that the matter had not been placed before the Chief Minister at the
initial stage. In the said case, the termination order had also been

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passed and the learned Single Judge had then interfered with the
order on this ground that at the initial stage the matter was not
placed before the Chief Minister. The matter had also been carried
to the Division Bench unsuccessfully by the State. Interference was
then done by the Supreme Court by holding as under :
“36. Since invocation of the provisions in Discipline and
Appeal Rules similar to Rule 14(3) of the 1965 Rules or
Rule 17(3) of the 2016 Rules and citing failure to adhere to
the same to invalidate orders terminating services of
officers/employees is not too infrequent, we consider it
proper to briefly touch upon the requirement thereof. The
Disciplinary Authority is mandated by the law to 'draw up'
or 'cause to be drawn up' the substance of the imputations
of misconduct or misbehavior as a definite and distinct
article of charge together with the statement of such
imputations. The phrases 'draw up' and 'cause to be drawn
up' do have different meanings in the context of
disciplinary proceedings, though both relate to drawing up
of a charge-sheet. By 'draw up', what is express is that the
Disciplinary Authority itself is responsible for preparing the
substance of imputation and the statement of allegations in
support thereof, whereas 'cause to be drawn up' would
enable the Disciplinary Authority to instruct or direct
someone else to prepare the substance and statement.
The effect of it is that the Disciplinary Authority itself may
not prepare the document but rather delegate the task to
someone else. If the delegation is proved to have been
made in favour of an authority holding an office superior to
that of the officer/employee proposed to be proceeded
against, nothing much is required to be done and the
courts ought to exercise restraint.

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37.

xxxxxx

38. Turning focus once again to the factual narrative, it is
worthy of being noted that it was the Cabinet which
approved the proposal to dismiss the respondent.
Respondent's service having been terminated based on
such approval, the Single Judge as well as the Division
Bench should have been loath to hold the dismissal illegal
on acceptance of the specious plea raised by the
respondent by its misplaced reliance on B.V. Gopinath
(supra) and Promod Kumar (supra).
39. Viewed from whichever angle, we are unable to
support the finding returned by the Single Judge, since
affirmed by the Division Bench, that the charge-sheet did
not have the approval of the competent authority though
both the Benches indubitably agreed that the proposal to
initiate disciplinary proceedings did have such approval.
We repeat, the entire proposal of initiating disciplinary
proceedings inclusive of the draft charge-sheet, to suspend
the respondent pending such proceedings and the names
of the officers who would conduct the inquiry and present
the case of the department in such inquiry having been
approved by the Chief Minister, the Single Judge seems to
have occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice in
interfering with the order of dismissal on the wholly
untenable ground of lack of approval of the charge-sheet
by the Chief Minister; and the Division Bench, by failing to
right the wrong, equally contributed to the failure of justice.”

16.

Keeping in view the above, once the record goes on to

show that the Executive Chairman had delegated the power at the
district level to the DLSA who is the District Judge and the Chairman
as per Section 9 of the Act, no fault as such can be found in the

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initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. It is the own case of the
petitioner as noticed in the rejoinder (sic replication) that there was
no delegation, which is contrary to the communication dated
22.03.2024 (Annexure R-2), where there is specific reference as
such by the Member Secretary, SLSA. We have also perused the
noting portion, whereby the then Executive Chairman, SLSA, on the
note being put up, granted the said approval on 21.03.2024 on the
basis of which the letter dated 22.03.2024 was issued.
17.

In such circumstances, the authority having been

delegated by the Executive Chairman, SLSA, we do not find that
any prejudice as such has been caused to the petitioner who apart
from the misconduct as such is also being charge-sheeted for misclassification of funds of Rs.41,50,000/- being shown in the State
grant instead of NALSA grant and also holding back payments of
the honorarium claim of mediators due to which action is sought to
be taken against him.
18.

The argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner

that there is no power of delegation under the Act has been
squarely met by the judgment of the Apex Court itself, which is
referred above, that on account of the delegation, the superior
officer can always give the authority to the subordinate officer to
conduct proceedings.

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19.

It is not the case of the petitioner that being the Senior

Assistant, he is in any way superior to the District and Sessions
Judge, Mandi and therefore, there can be no prejudice as such to
him.
20.

Keeping in view the above, the present writ petition

stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed
of.
( G.S. Sandhawalia )
Chief Justice
27th October, 2025
(ankit)

( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj )
Judge